




A person can fare well either over an extended period or at a particular 
moment. We evaluate how well a person fares over an extended period 
when we speak of him as having a good day, a good year, or a good life, 
or when we speak of such a period as going well for him. We evaluate 
how a person fares at a particular moment when we say that he is doing 
well just then. We favor different idioms in these two kinds of evaluation: 
we are more inclined to speak of a person as having a good life than as 
having a good moment; and, conversely, we are more inclined to use 
the terms ‘welfare’ or ‘well-being’ to express how well things are going 
for him at a particular moment than to evaluate how well his life goes 
as a whole. Nevertheless, evaluations of both kinds are judgments of 
relational value—of what’s good for the person or good in relation to his 
interests—and so they are bolh judgments of the person’s welfare.^
What is the relation between the welfare value^ of a temporal period in 
someone’s life and his welfare at individual moments during that period? 
And what is the relation between the value of a period and that of the 
shorter periods it comprises? Is a good day just a day during which one is 
frequently well off?̂  ̂Is a good week just a week in which the good days 
outweigh the bad? Is a good life just a string of good years?
The answer to these questions would be yes if well-being were additive. If 
the welfare value of a time-period in one’s life were equivalent to the sum 
of momentary well-being that one enjoyed during that period, then a 
good period would indeed be a period during which one was, on balance, 
well off, and a good life would be a life composed, on balance, of good 
periods. But I doubt whether well-being is additive in this way.
Of course, I do not mean to rule out the possibility that the amount of 
momentary welfare accruing to someone during his life and the welfare
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value of that life might turn out to be the same. I am simply saying that 
their being the same would ordinarily be an accident, because the welfare 
value of a life is not in general determined by, and cannot be inferred 
from, the amount of momentary well-being that the life contains.^
Here I am not merely denying that the value of a life can be computed 
by the addition of values antecedently assigned to its constituent 
moments. Computing the value of the whole in this manner, by com­
position, might be impossible only because the values of the parts had to 
be computed, inversely, by decomposition. If the only way to assess 
someone’s well-being at a particular moment was to compute the 
fraction of his life’s value that was being realized at the time, then the 
value of the whole would have to be computed first, and couldn’t be 
derived from the values of the parts.^ In that case, however, well-being 
might still be additive in the sense that interests me, since the values of 
the parts and the value of the whole might still be such that the latter had 
to equal the sum of the former. What I wish to deny is that well-being is 
additive in even this sense.
My claim thus militates equally against evaluating a whole life by 
composition and evaluating its parts by decomposition. In my view, just 
as assigning values to someone’s moments of existence and adding them 
will not necessarily yield the value of his life; so assigning a value to his 
life and dividing it among his moments of existence will not necessarily 
yield their values, either.
My strategy will be to criticize these alternative computations in turn. 
First I shall presuppose a rough understanding of momentary well-being, 
and I shall argue, on rather intuitive grounds, that the value of a life need 
not be the sum of the momentary well-being enjoyed within it. Then I 
shall argue, on more theoretical grounds, against regarding a person’s 
well-being at a particular moment as a currently realized fraction of his 
life’s value. In neither phase of the argument will I presuppose any 
particular theory of individual well-being; rather. I’ll apply what I take 
to be commonsense notions of faring well, either over one’s entire life or 
within the confines of a particular moment.
Intuitively speaking, the reason why well-being isn’t additive is that how 
a person is faring at a particular moment is a temporally local matter, 
whereas the welfare value of a period in his life depends on the global 
features of that period. More specifically, the value of an extended 
period depends on the overall order or structure of events—on what 
might be called their narrative or dramatic relations.'^
Consider two different lives that you might live. One life begins in the 
depths but takes an upward trend: a childhood of deprivation, a troubled 
youth, struggles and setbacks in early adulthood, followed finally by 
success and satisfaction in middle age and a peaceful retirement. Another
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life begins at the heights but slides downhill: a blissful childhood and 
youth, precocious triumphs and rewards in early adulthood, followed by 
a midlife strewn with disasters that lead to misery in old age. Surely, we 
can imagine two such lives as containing equal sums of momentary well­
being. Your retirement is as blessed in one life as your childhood is in the 
other; your nonage is as blighted in one life as your dotage is in the other.
Yet even if we were to map each moment in one life onto a moment of 
equal well-being in the other, we would not have shown these lives to be 
equally good. For after the tally of good times and bad times had been 
rung up, the fact would remain that one life gets progressively better 
while the other gets progressively worse; one is a story of improvement 
while the other is a story of deterioration. To most people, I think, the 
former story would seem like a better life-story—not, of course, in the 
sense that it makes for a better story in the telling or the hearing, but 
rather in the sense that it is the story of a better life.^
Note that I am not committed to the truth of this value judgment, in 
particular. I offer it merely as an intuitively plausible illustration of the 
possibility that periods containing equal sums of momentary welfare can 
have different overall welfare values. (The same goes for most of the 
value judgments offered below.) Even those who don’t agree with the 
present value judgment, or can imagine disagreeing with it, will at least 
acknowledge that it is a reasonable judgment to entertain; whereas it 
would be ruled out a priori if well-being were additive.
One who thinks that a life’s value is the sum of the momentary well-being 
enjoyed therein may seek to explain the outcome of this thought experi­
ment as due to subconscious assumptions that violate the experiment’s 
terms. That is, one may claim that a preference between lives stipulated 
to contain equal amounts of momentary well-being must arise from a 
silent refusal to grant the stipulation. Those who prefer the uphill climb 
to the downhill slide, one may say, are simply assuming that the highs 
and lows encountered in maturity are more extreme than those encoun­
tered in childhood, and that the intensifying effects of age, or mitigating 
effects of youth, make the goods of one life better and the evils of the 
other life worse.
But I doubt whether our preference between these lives can be traced 
to a denial of their supposed symmetry. We don’t necessarily assume that 
the best retirement is better than the best childhood, or that the miseries 
of age are worse, at their worst, than the miseries of youth. If asked why 
we prefer the life of improvement, we would be unlikely to express such 
views; we would be more likely to say, “A life that gets better is, other 
things being equal, better than a life that gets worse. We would then be 
expressing a preference between trends, as opposed to sums, of momen­
tary well-being, a preference that is entirely natural and yet at odds with
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the view that a life’s value is the sum of the values of its constituent 
moments.
This preference can be further sustained by reflection on the counter­
intuitive consequences of the opposing view.^  ̂If the value of a life were 
additive, then a life could be forever spoiled or saved by its initial 
segment. Every year of well-being would raise the minimum value to 
which one’s life could possibly fall; every year of suffering would lower 
the maximum value to which one’s life could possibly rise. An unfortu­
nate childhood would therefore make for a bad start in life, not only by 
leaving one emotionally or physically ill-equipped for future challenges, 
but also by permanently lowering the level of lifetime well-being to which 
one could reasonably aspire. Conversely, a fortunate childhood would 
provide not only the personal resources with which to succeed in the 
future but also so much lifetime well-being in the bank, so to speak, 
insuring the value of one’s life against subsequent reverses. But surely, 
we do not think, after reading the first few chapters of a biography, that 
they have placed limits on how well or how badly the subject’s life might 
possibly turn out. We don’t think, “He’s already fifteen years to the 
good,” or “. . . fifteen years in the hole,” as if registering credits or 
debits that will necessarily be reflected in the subject’s final accounts. Yet 
we do think that we know how well the person fared during the first 
fifteen years of his life.
My remarks thus far may differ only slightly from, and add only slightly 
to, what Michael Slote has said in his essay “Goods and Lives.” There 
Slote offers an example closely resembling the cases I have discussed:
A given man may achieve political power and, once in power, do things of great value, 
after having been in the political wilderness throughout his earlier career. He may later die 
while still “in harness” and fully possessed of his powers, at a decent old age. By contrast, 
another man may have a meteoric success in youth, attaining the same office as the first 
man and also achieving much good; but then lose power, while still young, never to regain 
it. Without hearing anything more, I think our natural, immediate reaction to these 
examples would be that the first man was the more fortunate . . . .
Slote goes on to say that our natural reaction to such a case “seems to 
suggest a time preference for goods that come late in life.”
Whether Slote is describing the phenomenon that I have in mind 
depends on how this last remark is to be interpreted. On the one hand, a 
preference for goods that come late in life may reflect the view that one 
and the same commodity, as measured in purely descriptive terms, often 
adds more to one’s well-being if it is received later. In that case, however, 
the preference in question is perfectly compatible with the view that a 
life’s value is the sum of the momentary well-being enjoyed therein. For
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even if a particular quantity of pleasure or money or fame gives a greater 
boost to one’s momentary welfare if it is received later in life, what 
the commodity adds to one’s total momentary welfare, whenever it is 
received, may still exhaust its contribution to the value of one’s life 
overall. On the other hand, the goods among which Slote’s temporal 
preference discriminates might be equilibrated as goods rather than as 
commodities—that is, in terms of their impact on one’s welfare at the 
time of their receipt. In that case, the preference reflects the view I am 
defending, that one and the same increment in one’s momentary well­
being may have greater or lesser effect on the value of one’s life, 
depending on when and how it occurs. Although Slote sometimes appears 
to favor the former view,^  ̂only the latter would place him in disagree­
ment with Sidgwick’s principle that “a smaller present good is not to be 
preferred to a greater future good” "̂̂—a principle with which Slote 
claims to disagree. I shall therefore interpret Slote’s “pure time prefer­
ence” as implying that a life’s value is not equivalent to a sum of momen­
tary well-being.
I hope to build on Slote’s observations in two ways. First, I would like 
to suggest a deeper explanation than Slote’s for the preferences cited in 
his article. While I agree with Slote that two benefits of equal momentary 
value may contribute differently to the welfare value of one’s life, I 
doubt whether they can do so merely because of their timing. They can 
do so, I think, because they can belong to different life stories, which 
coincidentally place them at different times.
Second, I hope to draw out the consequences of this phenomenon for 
various issues in moral psychology and moral philosophy. Among the 
issues I shall discuss are the evil of death, the nature of prudence, and the 
value of desire-satisfaction.
Consider the theoretical conclusion that Slote hopes to illustrate with the 
case cited above:
When a personal benefit or good occurs, may make a difference to how fortunate someone 
is (has been), quite independently of the effects of such timing in producing other good 
things and of the greater importance we attach to the distinctive goals and interests of 
certain life periods. And I believe, in particular, that what happens late in life is naturally 
and automatically invested with greater significance and weight in determining the goodness 
of lives.
While I agree with Slote’s evaluative intuitions about the case, I do not 
agree with this explanation of them. The reason why later benefits are 
thought to have a greater impact on the value of one’s life is not that 
greater weight is attached to what comes later. Rather, it is that later
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events are thought to alter the meaning of earlier events, thereby altering 
their contribution to the value of one’s life.
Suppose that we drew one of Slote’s politicians behind a veil of 
ignorance about his life and put to him the following proposition. He is 
to have ten years of political success, but he can choose whether his 
fortunate decade is to occur in his fifties or his thirties. How strong 
a preference would he have between the alternatives thus described? 
I suspect that he would be indifferent.^^ If he had any preference at all, it 
would be neither as strong nor as stable as the preference he would have 
if we described the alternative careers more fully, as they are described in 
Slote’s example. Merely postponing a fixed amount of well-being until 
later in life wouldn’t strike him as an obvious means of making it more 
valuable; indeed, he might reasonably regard well-being as more valuable 
if enjoyed in youth. Surely, then, the preference elicited by Slote’s 
example must depend on something other than the effects of mere 
timing.
In order to reproduce the preference elicited by Slote’s example, we 
would have to tell the aspiring politician that the later successes being 
offered to him would be the culmination of a slow ascent, whereas the 
earlier successes would be the prelude to a sudden decline. That is, we 
would have to tell him, not only about the timing of the rewards in 
question, but also about their place in a larger trend. He wouldn’t care 
whether a particular bundle of goods was to be encountered early or late 
in the game; what he would care about is whether they were to be en­
countered at the top of a chute or the top of a ladder.
Why would a person care about the placement of momentary goods on 
the curve that maps his changing welfare? The answer, I believe, is that 
an event’s place in the story of one’s life lends it a meaning that isn’t 
entirely determined by its impact on one’s well-being at the time. A 
particular electoral victory, providing a particular boost to one’s current 
welfare, can mean either that one’s early frustrations were finally over or 
that one’s subsequent failures were not yet foreshadowed, that one 
enjoyed either fleeting good luck or lasting success—all depending on its 
placement in the trend of one’s well-being. And the event’s meaning is 
what determines its contribution to the value of one’s life.̂ ®
The meaning attached to a quantity of momentary well-being is deter­
mined only in part by its place in the overall trend. The meaning of a 
benefit depends not only on whether it follows or precedes hardships but 
also on the specific narrative relation between the goods and evils 
involved. Slote’s politician would have experienced an improvement in 
his well-being whether his years of toil were capped by electoral victory 
or merely cut short by his winning the lottery and retiring young. But the 
contribution of these alternative benefits to the overall value of his life 
wouldn’t be determined entirely by how well-off each would make him
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from one moment to the next. Their contribution to his life’s value 
would also be determined by the fact that the former would be a well- 
earned reward, and would prove his struggles to have been a good 
investment, whereas the latter would be a windfall in relation to which 
his struggles were superfluous. Thus benefits that would effect equal 
improvements in his momentary well-being might contribute differently 
to the value of his life, by virtue of lending and borrowing different 
meanings in exchange with preceding events.
The most familiar illustration of this principle is the commonly held 
belief in the importance of drawing lessons from one’s misfortunes. If a 
life’s value were a sum of momentary well-being, learning from a mis­
fortune would be no more important than learning from other sources, 
since every lesson learned would add so much value and no more to the 
sum of one’s well-being. On being invited to learn from a personal 
tragedy, one would therefore be entitled to reply, “No, I think I’ll read a 
book instead.” Edification would offset the losses incurred in the 
tragedy, but its having been derived from the tragedy wouldn’t render 
edification more valuable, either intrinsically or extrinsically. Any lesson 
of equal value would offset one’s losses equally.^®
The point of learning from a misfortune, surely, is to prevent the 
misfortune from being a total loss. Learning from the misfortune confers 
some value on it, by making it the means to one’s edification. But how 
could this be the point? The instrumental value of a means is not to be 
counted as additional to the intrinsic value of the end. (Otherwise, we 
would be obliged to pursue our ends as circuitously as possible, so as to 
accumulate the most instrumental value along the way.) Since the value 
of a means is not additional to that of the end, turning a misfortune into 
a means of learning a lesson doesn’t produce any more value than that 
inherent in the lesson itself, a value not necessarily greater than that of 
any alternative lesson one might have learned. So how can the point of 
learning from a misfortune, in particular, be to confer instrumental 
value on it?
The answer, I believe, is that conferring instrumental value on a mis­
fortune alters its meaning, its significance in the story of one’s life. The 
misfortune still detracted from one’s well-being at the time, but it no 
longer mars one’s life story as it formerly did. A life in which one suffers 
a misfortune and then learns from it may find one equally well-off, at 
each moment, as a life in which one suffers a misfortune and then reads 
the encyclopedia. But the costs of the misfortune are merely offset when 
the value of the latter life is computed; whereas they are somehow can­
celled entirely from the accounts of the former. Or rather, neither mis­
fortune affects the value of one’s life just by adding costs and benefits to 
a cumulative account. The effect of either misfortune on one’s life is
WELL-BEING AND TIME 55
proportionate, not to its impact on one’s continuing welfare, but to its 
import for the story. An edifying misfortune is not just offset but 
redeemed, by being given a meaningful place in one’s progress through 
life.2i
The same point can be illustrated with other examples. In one life your 
first ten years of marriage are troubled and end in divorce, but you 
immediately remarry happily; in another life the troubled years of your 
first marriage lead to eventual happiness as the relationship matures. 
Both lives contain ten years of marital strife followed by contentment; 
but let us suppose that in the former, you regard your first ten years of 
marriage as a dead loss, whereas in the latter you regard them as the 
foundation of your happiness.The bad times are just as bad in both 
lives, but in one they are cast off and in the other they are redeemed. 
Surely, these two decades can affect the value of your life differently, 
even if you are equally well off at each moment of their duration. From 
the perspective of your second marriage, you may reasonably think that 
your life would have gone better if you could have made your first 
marriage work out; and you may reasonably think so without thinking 
that the first marriage, if successful, would have been better from day to 
day than the second. You can simply think that a dead-end relationship 
blots the story of one’s life in a way that marital problems don’t if they 
lead to eventual happiness.
Of course, your desire for a successful first marriage is fulfilled in the 
latter life, whereas in the former it is given up and replaced by the desire 
for a successful second marriage. In a sense, then, the former life differs 
from the latter by virtue of containing more unfulfilled desires. Doesn’t 
this difference in desire fulfillment explain the difference in perceived 
value between these lives?
I doubt whether a difference in desire fulfillment can do this explana­
tory job. Suppose, for example, that in both versions of the story your 
early desire to achieve happiness with your first mate was accompanied 
by an equally strong, competing desire to start afresh with someone else. 
The only difference between these desires, let us say, was that during 
your ten years of trying to fulfill the former, the latter remained an idle 
yearning on which you never acted. Now the two endings of your story 
no longer differ in respect to the fulfillment of your youthful desires: 
each ending fulfills one and frustrates one of the desires that you 
harbored throughout your first marriage. Do they consequently result in 
equally valuable lives? I am inclined to say not. For I am still inclined to 
prefer the ending in which your initial efforts are redeemed over the 
ending in which they are abandoned. Fulfilling a desire on behalf of 
which you have struggled may be more important than fulfilling a desire 
in which you have made no investment. Hence desire fulfillment perse is
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not what’s valuable; what’s valuable is living out a story of efforts 
rewarded rather than efforts wasted.
Insofar as the fulfillment of one’s past desires is valuable, I am 
inclined to say, its value depends on that of life stories in which desires 
are eventually fulfilled. For I cannot see how a difference in the fulfill­
ment of past desires can yield any difference in momentary well-being. 
Let us cancel the assumption that you always wanted to change mates, 
and return to the assumption that the beginning of your story, in either 
version, includes only a desire to make a go of your first marriage—a 
desire that’s fulfilled in one version but abandoned in the other. The 
question remains when you are rendered worse off, in the version that 
involves a second marriage, by the abandonment of your hopes for the 
first. Once you abandon those hopes, you acquire new ones—-for success 
in the second marriage—and these are richly fulfilled. You are therefore 
just as well off in your second marriage, from day to day, as you would 
have been in your first, had it flourished. To be sure, you are no longer 
achieving what your former self wanted you to achieve—namely, success 
in the first marriage—but this failure can hardly make your former self 
worse off retroactively. The daily well-being of your former self is a 
feature of the past, beyond alteration. Failure to fulfill your previous 
desires thus impinges on your interests without affecting your welfare at 
any particular moment.
Oddly enough, several philosophers have affirmed the possibility of 
retroactive effects on well-being—often in order to explain when a person 
suffers the evil of death.A ccording to these philosophers, a person’s 
death can make him worse off during the immediately preceding portion 
of his life, by preventing the fulfillment of the desires he has during that 
period.
These philosophers argue that our resistance to the idea of being 
currently harmed by future events is based on the false assumption that 
one cannot be harmed by things that don’t affect one’s conscious experi­
ences. But acknowledging the possibility of unexperienced harms should 
not necessarily lead us to acknowledge the possibility of present harms 
due to future events. For even if a person’s current welfare is not deter­
mined entirely by facts within his experience, it may still be determined 
entirely by facts within the present.
This restriction on the determinants of momentary well-being cannot 
be inferred directly from the impossibility of backward causation. Future 
events could affect one’s present well-being if present well-being were a 
relation between one’s present desires and the states of affairs that 
fulfilled or failed to fulfill them. In that case, retroactively harming 
someone would no more require retrograde causation than retroactively 
“making a liar” of him. But momentary well-being is ordinarily con­
ceived as a temporally local matter, determined by a person’s current 
circumstances, whether experienced or unexperienced. We think of a
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person’s current well-being as a fact intrinsic to the present, not as a 
relation that he currently bears to his future. We don’t say, of a person 
who dies in harness, that he fared progressively worse toward the end, 
simply because he was acquiring more and more ambitions that would go 
unfulfilled. Nor do we say, of a person raised in adversity, that his youth 
wasn’t so bad, after all, simply because his youthful hopes were even­
tually fulfilled later in life.^  ̂ We might say that such a person’s 
adulthood compensated for an unfortunate youth; but we wouldn’t say 
that it made his youth any better. Because the belief in retroactive 
welfare effects would entail such judgments, it strikes me as highly 
counterintuitive.
Thus, the reason why it is generally in your interests to promote the 
fulfillment of your current desires for the future cannot be that their 
future fulfillment will make you better off now. Nor can it be that their 
future fulfillment will make you better off then—that is, better off than 
you would be if you replaced them with different desires that got ful­
filled.^  ̂The reason why it is in your interests to promote the fulfillment 
of your current desires for the future is rather that a life story of 
ambitions conceived, pursued, and fulfilled may be a better life story 
than one of ambitions conceived, discarded, and replaced. And the one 
life is better than the other even though they may include equal amounts 
of momentary well-being.
My view of lifetime well-being provides a different explanation from 
Slote’s for the discrepancy in our attitudes toward early and late stages in 
life. My explanation begins with the observation that events in a person’s 
life can borrow significance from both preceding and succeeding events. 
A particular success can be either a windfall or a well-earned reward, 
depending on the amount of effort that preceded it; the expenditure of a 
particular effort can be either a good investment or a waste, depending 
on the degree of success that ensues. Retrospective significance—that 
which is gained from subsequent events—is often responsible for the 
discrepancy between total momentary well-being and lifetime value. For 
when subsequent developments alter the meaning of an event, they can 
alter its contribution to the value of one’s life, but they cannot retro­
actively change the impact that it had on one’s well-being at the time.
From the perspective of practical reasoning, in which the past is fixed 
but the future remains open, earlier events seem more susceptible to 
retroactive changes of significance. Even after the events of one’s youth 
have occurred, their import for one’s life story remains undetermined, 
since the events from which they will gain significance or to which they 
will lend significance lie primarily in the future. By contrast, the events 
of one’s old age occur in the determinate context of one’s past, with 
which they exchange fixed implications that are unlikely to be signifi­
cantly modified in what remains of one’s life. Thus, one looks forward
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to a lifetime in which to redeem one’s youth, but confronts events of 
middle age as having a single, determinate significance once and for all.
The result is, not that later events are more important, but that one 
sees less latitude for arranging them within the requirements of a good 
life. By middle age, one finds oneself composing the climax to a par­
ticular story—a story that is now determinate enough to be spoiled. 
Virtually any beginning might have been the beginning of a good life; but 
given one’s actual beginnings, there may now be only a few good ways of 
going on.^^
Because one will confront one’s prime with relatively narrow criteria 
of success, one is required to devote more care to planning it and to 
ensuring that it turns out as planned. The extraordinary attention paid to 
this stage in life may be misinterpreted as indicating that it is more 
important—that the events of middle age contribute more to a life’s 
value than events at other stages. The reason for paying more attention 
to one’s prime, however, is not that the possibilities at middle age are 
worth more than at other stages but rather that in relation to a fixed 
youth, fewer of the possibilities will result in a life that’s any good at all.
My account of the value judgments canvassed above amounts to the 
claim that the value of one’s life is what might be called a strongly ir­
reducible second-order good.^^ A second-order good is a valuable state 
of affairs consisting in some fact about other goods. Of course, cor­
responding to every good that someone might attain is the potential fact 
of his having thereby attained something good; and his having attained 
something good would undeniably be a good state of affairs consisting in 
a fact about other goods. There is therefore a second-order good cor­
responding to every attainable good of the first order. But such a second- 
order good is reducible to the first-order good implicated in it, in the 
sense that it has no value over and above that of the implicated first- 
order good. That is, when someone attains a good, he is not enriched by 
its value plus some additional value attaching to the fact of his having 
thereby attained something good. (If he were, then he would be infinitely 
enriched, since the second-order good would generate a good of the 
third order, and so on ad infinitum).
In order for a second-order good to be irreducible, it must at least 
possess value over and above that of its component first-order goods. A 
possible example of such a good in the realm of social value is that of a 
just distribution of benefits. Some people think that there can be value 
in redistributing benefits among the members of a society even if the 
redistribution doesn’t increase the total amount of good accruing to 
individuals. This thought implies that the resulting distribution has a 
value over and above that of the goods being distributed, and hence that 
the new distribution is an irreducible second-order good.
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There is yet a stronger form of irreducibility that may or may not 
attach to a second-order good whose value is additional to that of its 
components. Consider two possible views about the second-order value 
of a just distribution. On the one hand, we might judge that a distribution 
of individual benefits has a second-order value that depends entirely on 
the proportions among the shares of benefits distributed; on the other 
hand, we might judge that the justice of a distribution, and hence its 
value, depends on whether individuals deserve their shares by dint of 
their actions or characters. The first view implies that the value of a just 
distribution, though additional to that of the benefits distributed, can 
still be computed from the amounts in which those benefits are dis­
tributed. The view thus implies that facts about second-order value are 
still, in a sense, reducible to facts about mere quantities of first-order 
goods. By contrast, the second view implies that no facts about quantities 
of first-order goods can fully determine the facts about second-order 
value, since the latter also depend on facts about the conduct and 
characters of individuals. The second view thus implies that the second- 
order value of a just distribution is irreducible in a stronger sense.
The existence of second-order goods that are irreducible in either sense 
entails the existence of more than one dimension of value. If social 
justice is an irreducible second-order good, for example, then there must 
be a dimension of value other than total individual welfare—a dimension 
of social value, as it might be called—along which value can be produced 
even while total individual welfare remains constant.
In the case of distributing benefits among the periods in someone’s 
life, however, the corresponding implication may initially seem odd. If 
we regard a particular temporal distribution of well-being as having 
irreducible second-order value for a person, we would seem committed 
to claiming that its value lies along a dimension distinct from that of total 
individual well-being, since we shall have said that value can be produced 
by a redistribution that leaves total well-being constant. Yet the dis­
tribution in question is supposed to be good specifically for the person, 
and so its value would seem to lie along the dimension of individual well­
being rather than along any alternative dimension. We are therefore 
confronted with a puzzle. If a temporal redistribution of benefits 
produces no additional benefits for the person, how can it be beneficial 
to him? How can a person be better off under an arrangement that 
affords him no additional benefits?
The answer to this question is that the value of a temporal distribution 
of benefits needn’t lie along a dimension of value distinct from that of 
individual well-being; its dimension of value must be distinct only from 
that of momentary individual well-being, since momentary benefits are
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the benefits whose total remains constant under the envisioned redis­
tribution. Thus, regarding a temporal distribution of benefits as an 
irreducible second-order good requires the assumption that a person’s 
well-being has both a synchronic and a diachronic dimension. The value 
of someone’s life lies along the dimension of diachronic welfare, which 
is distinct from, and irreducible to, how well off he is at each moment 
therein.
Here we find, in a new guise, the value judgment with which I began— 
namely, that two lives containing equal sums of momentary well-being 
need not be equally good lives if their momentary benefits stand in 
different temporal or, more generally, different narrative relations. We 
can now see what this intuitive judgment implies: it implies that self- 
interest is not a unitary dimension of value. Rather, a person has two 
distinct sets of interests, lying along two distinct dimensions—his 
synchronic interests, in being well off at particular moments, and his 
diachronic interests, in having good periods of time and, in particular, 
a good life.
Although Slote regards a life’s value as weakly irreducible, he doesn’t 
regard it as irreducible in the stronger sense.S lote analyzes the values 
of lives in terms of weights assigned to momentary goods in accordance 
with the time of their occurrence. He says that some periods of life are 
more important than others, and hence that the goods and evils occurring 
in those periods are accorded greater weight when the value of a life is 
computed. His view therefore amounts to the claim that facts about the 
value of a life can be reduced to facts about the amounts and temporal 
order of the momentary benefits enjoyed therein—in short, to facts 
about temporal patterns of momentary benefits.
In my view, however, the facts about a life’s value are not even re­
ducible to this extent. Some of the value judgments considered above are 
incompatible with any reduction of diachronic well-being to synchronic 
well-being, no matter how sophisticated an algorithm of discounting and 
weighting is applied. Because an event’s contribution to the value of 
one’s life depends on its narrative relation to other events, a life’s value 
can never be computed by an algorithm applied to bare amounts of 
momentary well-being, or even to ordered sequences of such amounts, in 
abstraction from the narrative significance of the events with which they 
are associated. How the value of one’s life is affected by a period of 
failure combined with a period of success, for example, cannot be 
computed merely from the timing of these periods and the amounts of 
well-being they contain. Their impact on the value of one’s life depends 
as well on the narrative relations among the successes and failures 
involved. Were one’s travails in the political wilderness ended by ascent 
to high office? or were they ended by a lucky ticket in the lottery and a
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round-the-world cruise? Was one’s perseverance through rocky times 
vindicated or discredited by the particular way in which one eventually 
attained domestic happiness? Our evaluative intuitions about the impor­
tance of learning from misfortunes, or of salvaging one’s projects, thus 
imply that the value of a life is more strongly irreducible than Slote 
suggests.
The degree of irreducibility between second- and first-order goods deter­
mines the degree of independence between the corresponding dimensions 
of value. If we analyze the second-order value attaching to different 
patterns of benefits in terms of weights attached to those benefits, we 
shall continue to regard diachronic well-being as reducible to synchronic 
well-being, albeit by means of a time-weighted algorithm. The implication 
will therefore remain that the greater weight attached to some goods and 
evils, because of their occurring at important times, can be offset by a 
greater amount of goods and evils occurring at times of less importance. 
The second-order value of a benefit’s timing will thus be conceived as 
exchangeable for a greater amount of that or any other first-order 
benefit.
Thus, if the problem with a downward trend in well-being were that 
more importance attached to what happens in one’s prime, then there 
would have to be some amount of childhood happiness that was sufficient 
to compensate for midlife misfortunes even after the appropriate weights 
had been applied. Childhood well-being would still amount to so much 
credit earned toward a good life, even if that credit was computed at 
a discounted rate. Hence a life that took a slide would still be a good 
one if it started from a sufficient height.
If we suppose, however, that the second-order value of a life is simply 
not computable from the amounts and temporal order of the momentary 
benefits that it contains, then we must conclude that some second-order 
goods may not be exchangeable for goods of the first order (and vice 
versa). That is, there may be some undesirable turns of plot whose 
disvalue simply cannot be offset by greater amounts of momentary well­
being in the associated prelude or denouement. I find this implication 
more consonant with our evaluative intuitions than the implications of 
Slote’s view. It explains why we think that the value of someone’s life 
remains almost entirely undetermined even after he has passed an 
especially happy or unhappy childhood; and why we are inclined to 
perceive some wisdom in Solon’s refusal to declare Croesus happy 
without knowing how his life would ultimately turn out.^^
I therefore favor the principle that a person’s self-interest is radically 
divided, in the sense that he has an interest in features of his life that 
aren’t at all reducible to, and hence cannot be exchanged with, patterns
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of momentary well-being. Let me briefly suggest two possible applications 
for this principle.
First, I think that this principle, if correct, justifies a revision in the 
philosophical conception of prudence and imprudence. imprudence 
has traditionally been conceived as an irrational preference for momen­
tary goods that are closer in time, and prudence as a rational indifference 
toward the timing of such goods. Prudence and imprudence have thus 
been conceived as dispositions to value momentary goods differently. In 
my view, however, we should consider the hypothesis that imprudence is 
rather an undue concern for momentary goods altogether; and prudence, 
a rational appreciation for the second-order value of a good life—a 
disposition that cannot be constituted out of any appreciation for 
patterns of momentary goods. According to this hypothesis, a person 
can be imprudent no matter how carefully he balances momentary goods 
of the present against those of the future, if he does so without regard to 
the value of the resulting life, a value not reducible to temporal dis­
tributions of momentary goods; and a person can be prudent even if he 
pursues present benefits at the expense of future benefits, so long as the 
value of his life is thereby enhanced. Preferring the lesser but nearer 
good to that which is greater but more remote may sometimes be the 
prudent thing to do, if done in the service of one’s irreducible second- 
order interest in a good life.
A second application for the principle of divided self-interest has to do 
with the evil of death. A prevalent view about death is that it is bad for a 
person if, but only if, his continued survival would add to his accumu­
lation of momentary well-being. The choice between heroic medical 
treatment and passive euthanasia is therefore frequently said to require 
so-called quality-of-life considerations. Whether days should be added to 
or subtracted from a patient’s life is to be judged, according to the 
prevalent view, by whether the days in question would be spent in a state 
of well-being or hardship.
In my view, however, deciding when to die is not (despite the familiar 
saying) like deciding when to cash in one’s chips—not, that is, a decision 
to be based on the incremental gains and losses that one stands to 
accumulate by staying in the game. It is rather like deciding when and 
how to end a story, a decision that cannot be dictated by considerations 
of momentary well-being. Hence a person may rationally be willing to 
die even though he can look forward to a few more good weeks or 
m onths;and  a person may rationally be unwilling to die even though he 
can look forward only to continued adversity. The rationality of the 
patient’s attitude depends on whether an earlier or later death would 
make a better ending to his life story.
Thus far I have presupposed a prior understanding of what it is to be well
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off at a particular moment, and I have argued that the value of a person’s 
life is not reducible to his momentary well-being, so understood. The 
reader might be moved to object, however, that I am not entitled to my 
initial presupposition. One might think that the only legitimate con­
ception of a person’s well-being is that of his life’s value; and that any 
conception of his well-being at a particular moment must therefore be 
illegitimate insofar as it fails to capture the portion of his life’s value 
being realized at that moment.
I shall argue against this suggestion on grounds more theoretical than 
those of my previous arguments. First I shall offer a more theoretical 
explanation of why a person’s momentary well-being might fail to be 
additive. The reason, I shall claim, is that a person’s well-being at each 
moment is defined from the perspective of that moment, and values 
defined from different perspectives cannot necessarily be added together. 
This explanation will prompt the suggestion that the successive perspec­
tives defining momentary well-being simply distort the true values of 
things, which are properly defined from the comprehensive perspective 
of an entire life. I shall then argue against this suggestion, by defending 
the independent validity of momentary perspectives. Finally, I shall 
explore some further implications of these theoretical results.
That momentary well-being might not add up should come as no 
surprise: values are rarely additive. Notoriously, the value of two things 
together need not be the sum of their individual values.T he value of 
having two egg rolls on one’s plate is less than the sum of the values of 
having one or the other of them; and the value of having one egg roll and 
a dollop of plum sauce is more than the sum of the values of having 
either an egg roll or plum sauce alone. To be sure, the value of having 
two egg rolls is indeed the sum of their marginal values: marginal values 
are additive. But marginal values are additive only because they are 
defined by decomposition of total value, to begin with. That is, the 
marginal value of one’s second egg roll is defined as the amount by which 
its acquisition increases one’s total well-being; and this definition 
guarantees that the acquisition of a second egg roll increases one’s well­
being by the addition of its marginal value. The point previously made 
by saying that the values of egg rolls aren’t additive can then be made 
by saying that the marginal values of two successive egg rolls aren’t 
the same.
Of course, what’s currently at issue is not additivity in the value of 
some commodity such as food but additivity in well-being itself. The 
question is not whether two egg rolls are twice as good as one but 
whether being well off at two different times is twice as good as being 
well off at one time. And we might have thought that although successive
64 PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
helpings of food can vary in their impact on one’s well-being, and hence 
in their marginal value, successive helpings of well-being cannot.
This thought might have been correct if the helpings in question were 
defined in relation to the same context of evaluation. But since helpings 
of momentary well-being are defined in relation to different contexts, 
they aren’t additive at all. Let me explain.
The reason why the marginal value of successive egg rolls varies is that 
the value of acquiring an egg roll depends on the context in which the 
acquisition occurs. One’s second egg roil is worth less than the first 
because it is acquired in the context of one’s already having the first. Of 
course, once the second egg roll is assigned a marginal value, that value 
needn’t be further adjusted because of its being acquired in the context 
of the well-being that’s already, so to speak, on one’s plate; the egg roll’s 
marginal value already reflects the only adjustment necessitated by the 
context.
Nevertheless, we often restrict the context in which judgments of value 
are made. For example, we make distinct assessments of how well off 
someone is in different respects—assessments of his financial well-being, 
say, or his emotional well-being, and so on. And such evaluations are 
made within restricted contexts. An assessment of someone’s financial 
well-being may take account of the diminishing marginal value of 
d o lla rsh is  second million needn’t be thought to make him twice as well 
off, financially speaking, as the first. But our assessment of someone’s 
financial well-being does not take account of interactions between his 
finances and other goods. The impact of a million dollars on someone’s 
overall well-being may depend not only on how much wealth he already 
has but also on his emotional state or his health. But the potential inter­
actions between wealth and these other goods are screened off from 
assessments of specifically financial well-being. Two people with equal 
assets and liabilities (and, perhaps, similar attitudes towards money) are 
judged to be equally well off, financially speaking, even if those assets 
and liabilities affect their overall welfare differently, by virtue of their 
differing emotional or physical circumstances. '̂^
Consequently, we cannot compute a person’s overall well-being at a 
particular moment by adding up his concurrent financial well-being, 
emotional well-being, physical well-being, and so on. The problem is not 
simply that we don’t know how to commensurate among wealth, health, 
and sanity—that is, how to bring these commodities under a common . 
unit of value for the purposes of addition and subtraction. The problem 
is that such restricted assessments of well-being are made in isolation 
from potential interactions among the goods involved. Our assessment 
of the person’s financial well-being doesn’t reflect how his emotional and 
physical circumstances affect the marginal value of his wealth; our 
assessment of his emotional well-being doesn’t reflect how his physical
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and financial circumstances affect the marginal value of his sanity; and 
so forth. Thus, even if we could establish an equivalence of value 
between a helping of financial well-being and a helping of physical well­
being, we wouldn’t have established that the combination of the two was 
worth twice as much as either one alone, since our measures of financial 
and physical well-being would not reflect potential interactions between 
the values of the underlying commodities.
We can easily forget this limitation on evaluative calculations if we 
imagine value itself to be a commodity. If we picture financial well-being 
as an elixir distilled from piles of money, we shall think of it as having an 
independent existence; and we shall then be inclined to think that when 
financial well-being is added to the values distilled from physical health 
or emotional stability, the resulting brew must simply be the sum of its 
ingredients. But an amount of financial well-being is not a quantity of 
stuff; it is rather a property of one’s financial state. Indeed, it’s a 
property that one’s financial state possesses only in relation to other 
possible financial states, just as one’s overall well-being at a particular 
moment is a relation of one’s overall state to the other states that one 
might be in. And there is no reason to assume that the relation of one’s 
overall state to its possible alternatives can be computed from the rela­
tions of its parts or aspects to theirs.
The problem of compounding values is analogous, in many respects, 
to problems in the compounding of chances. Notoriously, the probability 
of a person’s having the trait p or q h  not necessarily equal to the prob­
ability of having p  plus that of having q, since the latter probabilities may 
not be independent; and for the same reason, the probability of having 
the trait p and q is not necessarily equal to the product of the probabilities 
of having the component traits. Consequently, we cannot estimate how 
unusual a person is by compounding the degrees to which he is physically 
unusual, psychologically unusual, socially unusual, and so on. The 
product of these probabilities may not reflect the extent to which the 
person possesses physical and psychological traits that are individually 
rare but often combined, or vice versa. This computation would therefore 
count someone with red hair and a hot temper as doubly unusual,even 
if these two unusual traits tend to go hand in hand; and it would cor­
respondingly underestimate the rarity of someone who is both beautiful 
and modest. In estimating how physically unusual a person is, we do take 
account of interactions among the probabilities of physical traits (red 
hair and freckles); in estimating how psychologically unusual he is, we 
take account of interactions among the probabilities of psychological 
traits (hot temper and romantic passion); but in neither case do we 
consider interactions between physical and psychological probabilities. 
Because these estimates of probability are thus confined to different 
contexts, they cannot be added or multiplied together.
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In short, calculating someone’s overall well-being by adding up his 
physical and emotional welfare is no more appropriate than calculating 
how unusual he is by compounding his physical and emotional quirki­
ness. My view is that momentary well-being lacks additivity for the same 
reasons. Estimates of momentary well-being are made within a restricted 
context—namely, the context of the events and circumstances of the 
moment. How well off someone is judged to be at one moment doesn’t 
reflect potential interactions between the value of what obtains and 
happens then and the value of earlier or later events. Hence evaluations 
made in the context of one moment cannot be added to evaluations made 
in the context of another. Being well off on two occasions doesn’t 
necessarily make a person doubly well off, any more than being both 
physically and psychologically unusual makes him doubly unusual.
Again, we shall tend to forget this limitation on evaluative calculations 
if we imagine an amount of momentary well-being as a quantity of stuff, 
derived from the facts of the moment but then having an independent 
existence of its own. In reality, one’s well-being at each moment is a 
relation between the facts of the moment and alternative possibilities; 
and there is no reason to assume that the relations of successive facts to 
their alternatives determine the relation of the entire succession to its 
alternatives.
My claim that momentary well-being is assessed from a restricted per­
spective might seem to undermine my earlier claim that a person’s self- 
interest is divided. Doesn’t my latest argument show that a person’s 
synchronic interests are divided from his diachronic interests only in the 
sense that his financial interests, say, are divided from his interests as a 
whole? Either division, one might think, is merely an artifact of the 
restrictions placed on the context in which synchronic or financial 
interests are assessed: a person’s interests, comprehensively considered, 
are still unified.
Although I agree that the division between synchronic and diachronic 
interests results from the difference between the perspectives from which 
they are assessed, I hesitate to assume that the more comprehensive of 
these perspectives has exclusive authority. In the case of a person’s 
financial interests, of course, I am inclined to say that insofar as they 
diverge from his interests overall, they should be regarded as a figment of 
a restricted perspective and should be ignored. Although a person can • 
limit his attention and concern to financial matters from time to time, the 
resulting value judgments, even if correct, have no independent authority 
on which to stand in competition with more comprehensive judgments of 
his interests.
A person’s synchronic interests, however, strike me as having an inde­
pendent claim that is not necessarily overridden by that of his diachronic
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interests. The reason, I think, is that a person himself has both a syn­
chronic and a diachronic identity. The perspectives from which synchronic 
interests are assessed, unlike the financial perspective, are not optional 
points of view that a person may or may not adopt from time to time. 
They are perspectives that a person necessarily inhabits as he proceeds 
through life, perspectives that are partly definitive of who he is. An 
essential and significant feature of persons is that they are creatures who 
naturally live their lives from the successive viewpoints of individual 
moments, as well as from a comprehensive, diachronic point of view.
To think that the more comprehensive of these perspectives must have 
greater authority is, I believe, to mistake how perspectives bear on 
questions of relational value. When we choose between competing 
theories about one and the same phenomenon, the more comprehensive 
theory may be preferable, other things being equal. But the different 
perspectives currently in play aren’t competing theories about the same 
phenomenon; they’re partly constitutive of different phenomena—that 
is, different modes of relational value. Because well-being is a relational 
value, it is constituted, in part, by a point of view—namely, the point of 
view inhabited by the creature whose well-being is in question. What’s 
good for that creature, in particular, depends on what point of view it 
inhabits by virtue of being the particular creature it is.
Thus, although the perspective of a particular creature is less com­
prehensive than that of the entire universe, evaluations relative to the 
creature’s perspective aren’t any less authoritative than those relative to 
the universe’s point of view. Evaluations relative to a particular creature’s 
perspective are authoritative about what’s good for that creature; and 
what’s good for a particular creature is really and truly good for that 
creature, even if it isn’t good for the universe. These two perspectives 
aren’t two competing theories about one and the same mode of value; 
they’re constitutive of two different modes of value.
Similarly, evaluations from the perspective of a single moment in 
someone’s life needn’t be less authoritative than those which are relative 
to the perspective of his life as a whole. Both are judgments of relational 
value, which is constituted in either case by a particular point of view; 
and evaluations relative to either point of view are authoritative about 
what’s good from that point of view.
The question, then, is not whether what’s good from the perspective of 
a moment in someone’s life is really good, since it really is good from 
that perspective. The question is rather whether the perspective in 
question has a subject—whether there really is a creature whose per­
spective it is and who therefore is the subject of the values it constitutes. 
To this latter question, I think, the answer is yes. By virtue of being who 
you are, you unavoidably occupy successive momentary viewpoints as 
well as a diachronic one; and just as what’s good from the latter view­
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point is good for you as protagonist of an ongoing life, so what’s good 
from the former viewpoints is good for you as subject of successive 
moments within that life."^
Note that in arguing for the validity of synchronic perspectives, I am 
not defending or attacking any thesis about time preferences/^ I am not 
trying to show that one is entitled to take a greater interest in the present 
moment than in other moments in one’s life. In my view, no one momen­
tary perspective takes precedence over any other. My brief is on behalf of 
all momentary perspectives equally, against the assumption that their 
deliverances are to be overridden by those of the diachronic perspective 
that subsumes them. I am trying to show that the value something has for 
someone in the restricted context of a single moment in his life is a value 
that genuinely accrues to him as the subject of that moment, even if 
interactions with events at other times result in its delivering a different 
value to him in his capacity as the protagonist of an entire life. The good 
that something does you now is not just the phantom of a restricted 
method of accounting; it’s an autonomous mode of value.
If I am right about the autonomy of synchronic interests, then a 
person’s well-being at a particular moment cannot be computed from the 
fraction of his life’s value being realized at the time, any more than the 
value of the whole can be computed from the values of its parts. To 
assess the benefits that someone is currently receiving in terms of their 
share in the value of his life would be to evaluate everything in the more 
comprehensive context. Such a method of evaluation might be appropri­
ate for Tralfamadorians, who don’t live one moment at a time,^^ but it 
isn’t appropriate for human beings. Just as evaluating a life by adding up 
the values of its component moments entails neglecting the perspective 
that encompasses the unity of those moments, so evaluating moments in 
a life by dividing up the value of the whole entails neglecting the per­
spectives that preserve their individuality. Each moment in a life is, 
momentarily, the present. And for a human being, the present is not just 
an excerpt from a continuing story, any more than the story is just a 
concatenation of moments.^^
What if a creature cannot adopt a perspective that encompasses a par­
ticular combination of goods? How then do we assess what value the 
combination has for him or how the values of its components interact?
Consider a nonhuman animal, such as a cow or a pig. I assume that a 
cow cannot conceive of itself as a persisting individual and consequently 
cannot conceive of itself as enjoying different benefits at different 
moments during its life. What the cow cannot conceive, it cannot care 
about; and so a cow cannot care about which sequences of momentary 
goods it enjoys. The cow cannot care twice as much about faring well at
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two distinct times than it cares about faring well right now—not because 
it can care only less than twice as much, but rather because it cannot care 
at all, being unable to conceive of itself as persisting through a sequence 
of benefits.
The upshot is that any judgment we make about the value that a 
particular sequence of benefits has for a cow will bear no relation to how 
the cow would or should or even could feel about that sequence of 
benefits. And this result seems incompatible with even a weak form of 
internalism about value, which would at least rule out the possibility that 
something can be intrinsically good for a subject if he is constitutionally 
incapable of caring about it. I am not sympathetic to stronger versions of 
internalism, which make a thing’s intrinsic value for someone contingent 
on his being disposed to care about it under specified or specifiable 
conditions; but I am inclined to think that unless a subject has the bare 
capacity, the equipment, to care about something under some conditions 
or other, it cannot be intrinsically good for him.^
Of course, we can adopt yet a weaker form of internalism, which 
allows for intrinsic goods that the subject cannot care about, so long as 
they are compounded out of goods that he can. But this version of 
internalism will be unstable, for two reasons.
One reason is that this version will commit us to constrain some of our 
judgments about intrinsic relational value within the bounds of internal­
ism ^nd yet to make other, similar judgments that exceed the same 
bounds. If we assume that what cannot be of concern to a creature can 
nevertheless have intrinsic value for that creature, provided that it is 
divisible into components that can be of concern, then we shall need to 
adopt some method for combining the values of the components. In 
order to add up the momentary goods enjoyed by a cow, for example, we 
shall have to make some assumption about how the values of those goods 
interact, so that we can compute their combined value. And this assump­
tion will constitute another judgment of intrinsic relational value. To 
suppose that a cow’s momentary well-being consists in this or that 
feature of its current circumstances is one value judgment; but to 
suppose that the values of the cow’s good moments can be combined in 
this or that way is a further value judgment, a judgment to the effect that 
two moments containing the relevant feature are this much or that much 
better for the cow than one.
Whether we say that one moment of such-and-such a kind is good for 
a cow, or that two such moments are thus-and-so much better for the 
cow, we are making a judgment of intrinsic relational value. Yet the 
proposed version of internalism will say that the validity of the former 
judgment depends on the cow’s ability to care about the object of evalu­
ation, whereas the validity of the latter does not. On what grounds can 
this distinction be drawn? Surely, whatever intuitive reasons we have for
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applying the internalist constraint to the first value judgment are likely to 
be reasons for applying it to the second.
Another, related instability in the resulting view is that it is at odds 
with a fundamental intuition about relational value—namely, that the 
value something has for a particular creature is, somehow grounded in or 
determined by that creature’s point of view.^  ̂ Insofar as we commit 
ourselves to combining the values accruing to a subject from goods 
whose combinations exceed his comprehension, we shall find ourselves 
making relational value judgments that are not appropriately related to 
the subject’s perspective. There is nothing about the perspective of a cow 
that supports one assumption rather than another about how the value of 
two momentary benefits stands to the value of either benefit alone, given 
that sequences of such benefits are beyond the cow’s ken and thus, as it 
were, nothing to the cow. The combined value would therefore have no 
claim to represent what’s good for the cow, or what’s good from the 
cow’s perspective."^^
Note that this problem is equally acute for all possible assumptions 
about how the cow’s momentary benefits should be combined. Even the 
assumption that two equally good moments in the cow’s life are twice as 
valuable as one presupposes a flat curve of marginal value;^^ and this 
presupposition has no basis in the cow’s point of view. Such a straight­
forward method of adding benefits may have the advantages of simplicity 
and salience in comparison with other methods, but these advantages 
shouldn’t be mistaken for truth. In respect to truth, any method of 
combining the values of a cow’s good and bad moments will be purely 
arbitrary and consequently defective, insofar as it fails to represent what 
values things have specifically for the cow rather than from some other 
perspective.
I therefore think that we should refuse to combine the momentary 
benefits and harms accruing to a cow; we should conclude, instead, that 
a cow can fare well or ill only at particular moments. Good and bad 
things can befall a cow, but they are good or bad for it only at particular 
times and thus bear only a time-indexed sort of value. There is no time­
less dimension of value along which the cow progresses by undergoing 
successive benefits and harms. Hence the various benefits accruing to a 
cow at different moments must not add up to anything at all, not even to 
zero: they must simply be unavailable for addition.
As before, if we imagine the cow’s momentary well-being as a com­
modity, then we shall be puzzled by the claim that amounts of this 
commodity cannot be added together. But once we realize that the cow’s 
momentary well-being is a relation that the cow’s current state bears to 
other possible states, the air of mystery is dispelled. For there is nothing 
odd about the suggestion that a relation obtaining between momentary 
states of a cow cannot obtain between sequences of those states. One
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moment can be better or worse for a cow than another moment, but one 
sequence of moments cannot be better for a cow than another sequence, 
because a cow cannot care about extended periods in its life. This 
conclusion seems mysterious only if we imagine one moment as better for 
the cow than another by virtue of containing more of a special stuff that 
cannot help but accumulate.
For a lower animal, then, momentary well-being fails not only of additivity 
but of cumulability by any algorithm at all. Consequently, the totality of 
this subject’s life simply has no value for him, because he cannot care 
about it as such, and because its constituent moments, which he can care 
about, have values that don’t accumulate.
This conception of a lower animal’s interests is supported, I think, by 
its fruitfulness in accounting for our intuitions about the moral difference 
between killing animals and killing people. For in relation to an animal’s 
interests, as I have now described them, the traditional Epicurean argu­
ments about death are correct. That is, there is no moment at which a 
cow can be badly off because of death, since (as Lucretius would put it) 
where death is, the cow isn’t;"̂® and if there is no moment at which a cow 
is harmed by death, then it cannot be harmed by death at all. A premature 
death doesn’t rob the cow of the chance to accumulate more momentary 
well-being, since momentary well-being isn’t cumulable for a cow; nor 
can a premature death detract from the value of the cow’s life as a whole, 
since a cow has no interest in its life as a whole, being unable to care 
about what sort of life it lives.
Of course, a person can care about what his life story is like, and a 
premature death can spoil the story of his life. Hence death can harm 
a person but it cannot harm a cow.^^
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NOTES
1 For comments on earlier drafts of this paper, I am indebted to Elizabeth Anderson, 
Fred Feldman, Jonathan Lear, Brian Leiter, Peter Railton, Connie Rosati, Michael Slote, 
and Nicholas White.
2 In this paper I assume that a person’s welfare is defined by his interests, or what’s good 
for him. According to some theories of the good, however, a person can have interests that 
do not bear on his well-being, since his interests are not all self-regarding, and his well­
being depends only on the fulfillment of self-regarding interests. These theories imply that 
what has value for a person and what improves that person’s welfare are not necessarily 
coextensive.
In my view, proponents of such theories should recognize two distinct ways of measuring 
the relational value attaching to a person’s life: first, the extent to which the life fulfills the
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person’s interests, broadly construed; and second, the extent to which the life fulfills the 
person’s self-interest, or welfare interests. Although I ignore this distinction, I believe that 
it could be introduced into my arguments with only a loss of simplicity.
(Thanks to Peter Railton for bringing this point to my attention.)
3 Henceforth I shall frequently drop the modifier and speak simply about the value of 
someone’s life. In all cases, however, I shall be referring to the welfare value of the 
life—that is, how well it goes for the person living it—rather than to its being morally 
praiseworthy, aesthetically pleasing, or endowed with significance. (See also notes 8 and 18 
below.) I shall also refer to the welfare value of someone’s life as his “lifetime well-being.”
4 Amartya Sen interprets the phrase ‘being well off’ as referring to something other than 
well-being. “The former,” he says, “is really a concept of opulence” (“Well-Being and 
Freedom,” the second lecture in “Well-Being, Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 
1984,” Journal o f Philosophy (1985), 82: 195 ff.). Without necessarily rejecting Sen’s 
intuitions about the meanings of these terms in ordinary parlance, I shall stipulate, for the 
purposes of the present paper, that ‘being well off’ refers to the state of having well-being.
5 This statement requires one minor qualification. I can imagine a kind of life whose 
welfare value would be determined by the amount of momentary welfare accruing to its 
subject. This would be a life with virtually no narrative structure at all—say, the life of 
someone who is maintained, from birth to death, in a state of semiconsciousness and 
inactivity. That this particular life would be only as good as the sum of its good and bad 
moments is perfectly compatible with my claim that a life’s value is not in general a function 
of momentary well-being.
6 I believe that James Griffin denies additivity in this sense. He initially says, “We can 
never reach final assessment of ways of life by totting up lots of small, short-term utilities. 
. . .  It has to take a global form: this way of living, all in all, is better than that” {Well- 
Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance {0\iox&. Clarendon Press, 1986), 
pp. 34-35). But Griffin then goes on to say that the values of a life’s components should 
be assessed in terms of the components’ contributions to the value of the whole, in such a 
way that “aggregation” is preserved (see esp. p. 36). Thus, Griffin’s objection to the 
“totting-up model,” as he calls it, is an objection to computing values by composition 
rather than decomposition. (See also pp. 88, 104-105, 144-146.)
The notion that the value of a life depends on its narrative structure appears in many 
works, including Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1984), Chapter 15; and Charles Taylor’s Sources o f the Self: The Making o f 
the Modern Identity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 47 ff.
8 Michael Slote has pointed out to me that my view is at risk of being confused with a 
view sometimes attributed to Nietzsche, to the effect that literary or aesthetic considerations 
determine the value of a life. (See Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985).) I am grateful to Brian Leiter for guidance 
on this subject.
^ Our preferences among trends in well-being are not confined to that for improvement 
over deterioration. I think that one may have reason to prefer variety and intensity to 
consistency and moderation—that is, a life of great joys and sorrows to one of uninter­
rupted contentment—even if the sum of momentary well-being were the same in both lives; 
or there may be reasons supporting the opposite preference. (Amartya Sen favors equality 
of well-being among the different moments in one’s life. See “Utilitarianism and Welfar­
ism,” Journal o f Philosophy (1970), 76, pp. 407 f.). As I have said, my argument doesn’t 
depend on showing one such preference to be more rational than another. I am arguing 
against a view that would deny the possibility of reasons supporting either preference, given 
the equal amounts of momentary well-being accumulated in the two lives.
The point made in this paragraph is borrowed from Connie Rosati, who makes it in a 
somewhat different context. See her “Mortality, Agency, and Regret” (forthcoming).
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Rosati has pointed out to me that people sometimes regret having started too late on a 
particular career or relationship, as if the value of their lives has been permanently reduced 
by this delay in their success or happiness. But I am not committed to denying that there 
can ever be a bad start that permanently depresses the value of one’s life. I am committed 
only to denying that early misfortunes necessarily depress the value of one’s life, as they 
necessarily would if well-being were additive.
What’s more, I suspect that the view of well-being as additive cannot properly account 
for the cases that Rosati has in mind. What these people regret is not the level of well-being 
that they enjoyed in youth but rather their delay in embarking on a particular project that 
(as they now realize) will provide an important theme or plot for their life’s story. Hence 
their regrets can be understood only as an attitude toward the narrative structure of their 
lives.
In Goods and Virtues (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), originally published in Pacific 
Philosophical Quarterly (1982), 63: 311-326. Recently the additivity of well-being has also 
been challenged by John Bigelow, John Campbell, and Robert Pargetter, in “Death and 
Well-Being” {Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (1990), 71: 119).
Nick White has pointed out to me that an early argument against the additivity of well­
being appears in C.I. VeWis's An Analysis o f Knowledge and Valuation (La Salle, IL: Open 
Court Publishing Co., 1946), Chapter XVI. In reading Lewis, I have difficulty separating 
(1) the claim that the juxtaposition of events in a life affects the value of the whole; (2) the 
claim that it affects the intrinsic character of the events themselves, which are colored by 
the recollection and anticipation of other events; and (3) the claim that the value of a life 
depends on its character as a diachronic experience that is not reducible to a succession of 
momentary experiences. My defense of (1) does not depend on claims like (2) or (3). My 
argument can thus be viewed as a generalization of Lewis’s, in which I abstract from 
Lewis’s experiential conception of value.
Pp. 23-24.
13 E.g., when saying that “a good may itself be greater for coming late rather than early 
in life” {ibid., p. 25).
14 The Methods o f Ethics (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1981), p. 381.
15 P. 23.
16 Here I am assuming that the veil of ignorance deprives the subject of information 
about his current age. For if he knew that he was currently in his forties, then he may have a 
preference arising out of what Parfit calls the bias toward the future {Reasons and Persons 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 165 ff.). Note, then, that the time preferences 
considered by Slote are different in structure from those considered by Parfit. Parfit is 
concerned with a preference between past and future, whereas Slote is concerned with a 
preference between early and late. As the subject's temporal relation to an event changes, 
the former preference yields a different attitude toward the event, but the latter does not.
Connie Rosati has suggested to me that a person might prefer earlier success because it 
would be a sign of genius. But this suggestion strikes me as only proving my point. The 
person so described would not prefer earlier success merely by virtue of its timing; he would 
prefer it only because he values the meaning of some story that its early occurrence would 
subserve.
17 Bigelow, Campbell, and Pargetter also express doubts about Slote’s treatment of this 
case. See “Death and Well-Being,” pp. 122-123.
18 To say that the meaning of an event determines its contribution to the valjiie of one’s 
life is not to equate a valuable life with a meaningful one. To be sure, meaningfulness is a 
valuable characteristic in a life, and it, too, is probably a function of the life’s narrative 
structure. But we can conceive of meaningful lives that aren’t particularly good ones for the 
people who live them; and we may be able to conceive of good lives that aren’t particularly 
meaningful. What’s more, the meaning, or narrative role, that determines an event’s
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contribution to a life’s value, in my view, must not be confused with the event’s meaning­
fulness, in the evaluative sense. To say that a particular increment in momentary well-being 
adds more to the value of a particular life if it has the meaning of a well-earned reward than 
that of a windfall is not to say that rewards are necessarily more meaningful events; it’s 
simply to say that their contribution to the life’s value depends on their being rewards.
9̂ Here I disagree with Bigelow, Campbell, and Pargetter, who believe that the value of 
someone’s life, though not reducible to the sum of the momentary well-being enjoyed 
throughout that life, nevertheless supervenes on the pattern of the person’s momentary 
well-being through time. (See “Death and Well-Being,” pp. 127-128, 136-137.) Indeed, 
these authors believe that momentary well-being just is that property—whatever it may 
be—whose profile through time determines the value of a person’s life {ibid.y p. 128). My 
reasons for rejecting this view are expounded in greater detail below.
20 In some cases, of course, what we hope to learn from a misfortune is how to avoid 
repeating some mistake that occasioned it. But why do we think it more important to learn 
how to avoid repeating a past mistake than to learn a different lesson, about how to avoid 
committing a novel mistake? The reason isn’t that we regard the consequences of a repeated 
mistake as necessarily worse than those of a mistake committed for the first time. We might 
prefer committing a novel mistake to repeating a past mistake even if their consequences 
would be equally bad. Surely, the reason is that we regard the story of committing the same 
mistake repeatedly as worse than that of committing different mistakes—a value judgment 
that depends on more than the momentary costs of the mistakes themselves.
One might think that our interest in learning from misfortunes, and the mistakes that 
occasion them, is based on the assumption that the mistakes a person has already committed 
are the ones that he’s most likely to commit in future, and hence that lessons learned from 
them are the ones that are most likely to be useful. I disagree. We value learning from 
mistakes even if we know that the opportunity to repeat them will never arise. And we value 
learning from misfortunes, such as grave illnesses or freak accidents, that are not in any 
way attributable to mistakes.
Finally, one might think that learning from a misfortune is valuable only because it is a 
means to a more pleasant consciousness of the misfortune—a means of “coming to terms” 
or “making peace” with it. But why not simply forget about the misfortune entirely, or turn 
one’s thoughts to something else? If making peace with a misfortune were valuable only as 
a means to pleasurable consciousness, then any alternative pleasure would serve just as 
well. Making peace with a misfortune is valuable not just because it entails acquiring so 
much peace of mind but because it entails acquiring peace of mind in a way that draws a 
fitting conclusion to one’s past.
(All of the objections considered in this note were suggested to me by Connie Rosati.)
21 Charles Taylor remarks on our concern for whether the past “is just ‘temps perdu’ in 
the double sense intended in the title of Proust’s celebrated work, that is, time which is both 
wasted and irretrievably lost, beyond recall, in which we pass as if we had never been” 
{Sources o f the Self, p. 43). Taylor goes on to say that our desire to prevent the present 
from becoming lost in this sense is a desire for “the future to ‘redeem’ the past, to make it 
part of a life story which has sense or purpose.” Taylor continues: “A famous, perhaps for 
us moderns a paradigm, example of what this can mean is recounted by Proust in his A la 
recherche du temps perdu. In the scene in the Guermantes’s library, the narrator recovers 
the full meaning of his past and thus restores the time which was ‘lost’ in the two senses' 
I mentioned above. The formerly irretrievable past is recovered in its unity with the life yet 
to live, and all the ‘wasted’ time now has a meaning, as the time of preparation for the work 
of the writer who will give shape to this unity” (pp. 50-51).
22 Of course, we can also imagine a life in which an unsuccessful first marriage teaches 
you lessons instrumental to the success of your second. But in that case, I would claim, 
your life would be better than it would have been if the first marriage had been a dead loss.
WELL-BEING AND TIME 75
23 Peter Railton has pointed out to me that I seem to be appealing to a desire that was 
omitted from my calculation of desire-fulfillment—namely, your desire for a life in which 
your efforts are rewarded. But I do not think that your desire for a life in which your 
efforts are rewarded is contingent on the assumption of your having that desire in the life 
under consideration.
24 These philosophers include Joel Feinberg {Harm to Others (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1984), pp. 79 ff.); and Bigelow, Campbell, and Pargetter (“Death and 
Well-Being,” pp. 134-135, 138). Note that in rejecting the notion of retroactive effects on 
a person’s momentary well-being, I do not necessarily reject the notion that the value of 
a person’s life can be influenced by events after his death. The reason is that I regard the 
value of a person’s life as a feature of his life story, and a person’s life story may not end 
at his death.
25 Indeed, I don’t see how Feinberg or Bigelow et at. can say that such a person’s life gets 
better at all if, in adulthood, he desires that his youth had gone differently.
26 Many philosophers have noted the absence of any rational requirement to satisfy 
desires that one had in the past (Derek Par fit. Reasons and Persons, Chapter 8; Richard 
Brandt, “Two Concepts of Utility,” in The Limits o f Utilitarianism, ed. by Harlan B. 
Miller and William H. Williams (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 
p. 180). To my knowledge, these philosophers do not raise the further question of why one 
has any present reason to promote the fulfillment of one’s desires for the future, given that 
one may have no reason to promote their fulfillment at the time. See also Amartya Sen, 
“Plural Utility,” Proceedings o f the Aristotelian Society (1981), 81: 202-204.
22 C.I. Lewis offers many suggestive remarks to the effect that striving and achieving 
have value only as related to each other in a diachronic whole {Analysis o f Knowledge and 
Valuation, pp. 498 ff.). As I have noted, however, Lewis’s remarks often rely on the notion 
that the experiences of striving and achieving suffuse one another or add up to an 
irreducible diachronic experience.
28 Subsequently, such constraints may relax to some extent, since the events of one’s 
retirement may be less intimately related to the other events in one’s life than those 
occurring at the culmination of one’s active career. A life story that has only one fitting 
climax may have more than one fitting denouement.
29 As Michael Stocker points out, the value of a life is what Moore would have called an 
“organic whole,” Plural and Conflicting Values (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 
pp. 300-302, 323.
30 The same goes for Bigelow, Campbell, and Pargetter, who argue that the value of 
someone’s life supervenes on the pattern of his momentary well-being through time. They 
say, “Surely if two people have had the same temporal well-being at all times of their life­
spans of equal length, they are to be seen to have had equal global well-being” (“Death and 
Well-Being,” p. 137). I say. Surely not. For if one person’s later good fortune redeemed his 
earlier sufferings and the other’s did not, the value of their lives might well differ.
31 Herodotus, I. 30-33. This story is cited by Aristotle {Nicomachean Ethics Lx. 1-2), 
whose final definition of happiness (at Lx. 15) also betrays an inclination to agree with 
Solon to some extent.
32 Some philosophers seem to regard ‘prudence’ as synonymous with “self-interested 
rationality” or “practical wisdom.” In this paragraph I am discussing prudence in a 
narrower sense, in which it denotes a specific aspect of practical wisdom—namely, a 
rational attitude toward the future.
33 For a clear presentation of this view, see Fred Feldman, “Some Puzzles About the Evil 
of Death,” forthcoming in The Philosophical Review. Feldman’s own view on the matter 
may not correspond to the view that he presents in this paper, since the paper adopts a 
simplistically additive hedonism merely for the sake of arguing with Epicureans. What 
Feldman does believe is that the evil of a particular death must be computed as the
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difference between the value of the actual life in which it occurs and that of the same life in 
the nearest possible world in which the death doesn’t occur. I do not in general accept this 
method of computing the value of events in someone’s life, since I believe that events have a 
momentary value that’s distinct from their contribution to the value of the subject’s life as 
a whole. Since death has no momentary disvalue, however, my view about it coincides with 
Feldman’s. I discuss this subject further below.
Griffin expresses doubts about this view in note 33, p. 355, of Well-Being.
35 See Griffin, Well-Being, pp. 36, 144-146.
36 In speaking of financial well-being, of course, I am assuming that wealth has intrinsic 
value for a person. Nothing in my argument depends on this assumption. Emotional, 
social, or physical well-being can be substituted in my arguments, mutatis mutandis, for 
financial well-being.
37 Assessments of emotional, physical, and professional well-being thus involve what 
Sen would call “informational constraints”—that is, constraints on which sorts of 
information are relevant. In Sen’s terms, the reason why people with equivalent financial 
holdings have the same level of financial well-being is that they belong to the same 
“isoinformation set” as defined by the applicable informational constraint. See “Moral 
Information,” the first lecture in “Well-Being, Agency and Freedom,” pp. 169-184.
38 For ease of expression, I have chosen to compare probabilities on a logarithmic scale. 
That is, I call p  doubly unlikely in relation to q if the probability of p  is equal to the 
probability of q squared.
39 See the preceding note.
^  This argument is in the same spirit as the following remarks of Thomas Nagel’s: 
“Human beings are subject to . . . motivational claims of very different kinds. This is 
because they are complex creatures who can view the world from many perspectives . . . 
and each perspective presents a different set of claims. Conflict can exist within one of these 
sets, and it may be hard to resolve. But when conflict occurs between them, the problem is 
still more difficult. . . . [Such conflicts] cannot, in my view, be resolved by subsuming 
either of the points of view under the other, or both under a third. Nor can we simply 
abandon any of them. There is no reason why we should. The capacity to view the world 
simultaneously from [different points of view] is one of the marks of humanity” (“The 
Fragmentation of Value,” in Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1979), p. 134). (Here I have made strategic deletions from Nagel’s remarks in a way that 
may exaggerate their similarity to my view.)
I am therefore making a somewhat different point from one made by Bernard 
Williams. When Williams says, “The correct perspective on one’s life is from now,'' he is 
criticizing the principle that one should “distribute consideration equally over [one’s] whole 
life” (“Persons, Character and Morality,” in The Identities o f Persons, ed. by Amélie 
Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), pp. 209, 206).
2̂ Kurt Vonnegut, Slaughterhouse Five (New York: Dell Publishing, 1969), p. 23: “The 
Tralfamadorians can look at all the different moments just the way we can look at a stretch 
of the Rocky Mountains . . . .  They can see how permanent all the moments are, and they 
can look at any moment that interests them. It is just an illusion we have here on Earth that 
one moment follows another one . . . .”
43 C.I. Lewis also defends the autonomy of momentary value {Analysis o f Knowledge 
and Valuation, pp. 503 ff.). Again, Lewis’s argument is based on an experiential conception 
of value.
44 I defend this view in “An Essay on Internalism” (manuscript). Note that internalism 
applies only to matters of intrinsic value. Obviously, something that’s beyond a person’s 
powers of comprehension can still be good for him extrinsically, since it can be conducive 
to things that are good for him intrinsically.
45 Of course, the intuition expressed here may not be independent of that expressed in
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internalism. Indeed, there are some interpretations of internalism according to which the 
two intuitions are one and the same. I separate them here because I regard internalism as 
resting on a rather different intuition. See my “Essay on Internalism.”
^  This point follows most clearly from desire-based conceptions of well-being, which 
will define how valuable different sequences of harms and benefits are for a cow in terms of 
how much the cow wants those sequences, or would want them under some ideal 
conditions. Since a cow cannot care about sequences of harms and benefits, and wouldn’t 
be able to care about them except under conditions that transformed it into something 
other than a cow, these definitions imply that temporal sequences cannot be assigned a 
value specifically for a cow.
Although my point thus follows from desire-based conceptions of relational value, it 
does not presuppose that relational value is desire-based. Judgments of relational value 
must somehow be relativized to the subject’s perspective—if not by being made to depend 
on the subject’s actual or counterfactual desires, then by some other means. And any 
strategy for relativizing evaluations of temporal sequences to the perspective of a cow will 
run into the same obstacle—namely, that the perspective of a cow doesn’t encompass 
temporal sequences at all.
(One might think that Peter Railton’s version of the desire-based conception would have 
the resources to circumvent this problem, since it would define what’s good for the cow in 
terms of what an idealized cow would want its actual self to desire (“Moral Realism,” The 
Philosophical Review (1986), 95: 163). The idealized cow, one might think, could acquire 
the ability to conceive of, and form preferences among, temporal sequences of harms and 
benefits while still doing so on behalf of its cognitively limited and hence fully bovine self. 
This suggestion strikes me as out of keeping with Railton’s theory, for various reasons, of 
which one will suffice for now. The cognitively enhanced cow, once fully informed, would 
realize that its actual self was unable to want temporal sequences of harms and benefits, 
and would therefore not bother wanting its actual self to have any such desires.)
47 See Griffin, Well-Being, p. 145: “Even when one does tot up, say, many small-scale 
pleasures to get an overall aggregate value, the value of the life containing these many local 
pleasures is fixed in comparison with competing forms of life, and so the finally effective 
magnitudes are fixed by global desires.” My point is that a cow is incapable of having the 
requisite global desires.
48 De Rerum Natura, III, 870 f., 898 f., cited by Bernard Williams in “The Makropulos 
Case,” Problems o f the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 83, n. 2.
49 Here I am not saying that a premature death is bad for a person because he wants or 
would want his life to be longer. Rather, I am saying that because a person can want his life 
to be longer, the judgment that a premature death is bad for him satisfies the requirements 
of internalism. To cite a person’s actual or potential desires as evidence that a value 
judgment is compatible with internalism is one thing; to cite those desires as the value 
judgment’s truth-makers is quite another.
These brief remarks on the evil of death were inspired by Thomas Nagel’s essay “Death,” 
in Mortal Questions, 1-10. Nagel points out that the Epicurean argument assumes that if 
death harms its victim, it must harm him at a particular time. Nagel argues that this 
assumption is false. (So does Fred Feldman, in “Some Puzzles About the Evil of Death.”) 
My claim is that although the assumption is indeed false in application to persons (which is 
the application that Nagel has in mind), it is true in application to lower animals.
